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Denny: Sales--Implied Warranty of Merchantability
CASE COMMENTS

Sales-Implied Warranty of Merchantability
D, a dealer in mobile homes, sold to Ps, by a written contract
containing no warranties, a mobile home equipped with a natural
gas cooking stove. D's agent moved the trailer to its permanent location, and made various repairs and adjustments to ready it for
occupancy. D's agent then assured Ps that the trailer was ready
for occupancy without need for further checking or inspection. Ps
moved into the trailer and lit the burners on the gas stove. Almost
immediately an explosion resulted. Ps obtained a judgment in the
trial court, which was reversed by the circuit court. Ps then appealed
to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Held, reversed and
remanded. Ps could recover for the personal injuries and damages to
the trailer. D's agent negligently induced the Ps to rely on assurances
that the trailer had been checked out and was ready for occupancy.
Relying on these false assurances Ps moved in, and as a consequence
were injured. Moreover, there was an implied warranty in relation
to the stove. The rule excluding implied warranties from sales of
goods in esse where the purchaser is given the opportunity to inspect
does not apply to this case. The stove involved as not merely a
defective chattel, or a chattel with a defective part. Here, the explosion was caused by the total absence of a vital component of the
stove. Implicit in the sale of the stove was an implied warranty that
the stove was a whole, complete stove. Breach of that implied warranty renders D liable. Nettles v. ImperialDistributors,Incorporated,
159 S.E. 2d206 (W. Va. 1968).
The cause of action in the principal case arose in April 1963, over
a year before West Virginia adopted the Uniform Commercial Code.
Thus, even though the case was not argued before the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals until 1967, the law of sales as it existed
prior to the Uniform Commercial Code controlled the outcome of
the case.
The majority opinion considered two theories of recovery asserted
by the Ps. First, the Ps claimed that relying on false assurances of
the D's agent caused their injuries. The court agreed with this argument, and it would seem that the Ps could have had their recovery on
this basis alone. The second theory of the Ps was grounded in warranty. Ps asserted that D breached an implied warranty of merchantability by sale of the defective stove. The court also upheld this
contention by a three to two decision with a disagreement over the
implied warranty furnishing the reason for the split.
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Implied warranties in contracts of sale have been the cause for
no small amount of confusion and disagreement. The early cases
in dealing with warranties make it clear that a seller was not liable
when the article which he sold was of bad quality, unless he was
aware of the quality. If one knew the goods he was selling were not
merchantable, at least if he were a dealer, the law might perhaps
have held him liable.' But as early as 1815 in Gardiner v. Gray,'
the strict doctrine of caveat emptor began to crumble. In that case,
Lord Ellenborough held that an implied warranty of merchantability
arose when goods were sold by description. However, this case
far from answered all the problems concerning the implication of an
implied warranty of merchantability. Sales concerning executory
contracts of sale, sales of an existing chattel specifically described,
sales where the buyer inspected the goods, and sales by a manufacturer all posed different problems. The difficulty was in what cases
should the warranty of merchantability be implied and in what
cases should the maxim of caveat emplor still retain its original
vitality. The classification most often adopted is borrowed from
the early case of Jones v. Just.' The first rule laid down by Judge
Mellor in that case states:
First, where goods are in esse and may be inspected by the
buyer, and there is no fraud on the part of the seller, the
maxim caveat emptor, applies, even though the defect which
exists in them is latent, and not discoverable on examination,
at least where the seller is neither the grower nor manufacturer. In such case, it is not an implied term of the contract
of sale that the goods are of any particular quality or are
merchantable.
In explaining the rationale of this rule Williston reasons that where
the buyer inspects, or has an opportunity to inspect, no warranty
is implied as to defects which the examination ought to reveal, for
the basis of implied warranty is justifiable reliance of the buyer upon
the seller's judgment. Where the defects are latent, however, the
buyer's right of inspection should not limit the implication of a
warranty in regard to such defects. This appears to be the English
rule, but, the tendency at common law in the United States was to
hold that inspection, or the opportunity for inspection, precludes the
2

S. WLLISTON, SALs § 228 (3d ed. 1948).
4 C.mp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (1815).
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L. R. 3 Q.B. 197 (1868).
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existence of any implied warranty, regardless of whether the defect
is latent or who is the seller.4
The West Virginia view prior to the adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code appears to be clearly in accord with what Williston
feels is the weight of authority. Two West Virginia cases specifically
adopt the principles set forth in Jones v. Just.' Likewise, three
other cases approve segments of Mellor's famous opinion.' Although
the majority opinion in the principal case indicates a dislike for the
pronouncements in Jones v. Just, they begrudgingly seem to concede
that the rules laid down in that case appear to be the law in West
Virginia, at least insofar as the principle that there can be no implied
warranty of merchantability when the buyer has an opportunity
to inspect and the seller is not a grower or manufacturer.
The principal case did involve the sale of an existing chattel, the
buyer did have an opportunity to inspect, and the seller was neither
a grower nor manufacturer. How then could the court find that
there was an implied warranty of merchantability with respect to
the gas cooking stove? The answer is not startling, for as might be
suspected, the court found the factual situation in the principal case
distinguishable from previous cases. In the principal case, the defect
which caused the gas stove to explode was the lack of a small
adapter, a tube which connected the oven burners to the gas supply.
As a result, when the Ps lit the burners on top of the stove, the oven
immediately filled with gas and then exploded from the gas flames
of the burners on top of the stove. Reasoning that even though the
rule in West Virginia may exclude implied warranties from sales of
goods in esse where the purchaser is given opportunity to inspect, the
court felt this case did not involve a merely defective chattel, or part
of a chattel, for here " ... only part of the stove was delivered . . .
to Ps. The distinguishing feature according to the majority was the
fact that a small part of the stove, a piece of tubing only a few inches
long, was totally absent. But what if only one half of the adapter had
been gone? Would the decision have been the same? Or, what
§ 234 (3d ed. 1948).
5 Schaffner v. National Supply Co., 80 W. Va. 111, 118-119, 92 S.E.
580, 583-584 (1917); Hood v. Bloch Bros., 29 W. Va. 244, 252-3, 11 S.E.
910, 913 (1886).
4 1 S. WLLisTON, SAL.s

6

Showwalter v. Chambers, 77 W. Va. 720, 726, 88 S.E. 1072, 1074

(1916); Erie City Iron Works v. Miller Supply Co., 68 W. Va. 519, 521-522,
70 S.E. 125, 126 (1911); Watkins v. Angotti, 65 W. Va. 193, 198, 63 S.E.
969, 971 (1909).
7 159 S.E.2d 206, 213 (1968).
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if there had been only a hole in a gas line in the stove and escaping
gas from this hole had caused the explosion? In both cases it could
not be said that the stove was entirely whole, for in both situations
the absence of something, i.e., half of the adapter and the amount
of metal necessary to span the hole, would be gone. Likewise, it
could be said that the Ps did not receive a whole stove and the
rule excluding implied warranties should not apply. It can hardly
be claimed sound jurisprudence, or even good logic, to imply a
warranty of merchantability merely because a small part of a
chattel is totally absent, and in a sale of a similar chattel to
exclude such a warranty if all parts are present yet the chattel was
improperly assembled. As Judge Browning, joined by Judge
Haymond, points out in the dissent:
The ingenuity of a judge whether he sits beside the Kanawha,
the Potomac or the Wabash, when he sets out to "distinguish
upon the facts" a case under consideration from previous
decisions of his court which are totally indistinguishable is
something to behold. To my mind, it is pure sophistry to say that
the fact that the part of the stove called an "adapter" was
negligently not inserted by the manufacturer rather than being
defective distinguishes this case from the previous decisions.8
The dissent went on to say that the rule excluding implied
warranties from the sale of goods in esse, where the purchaser is
given the opportunity to inspect was firmly established in West
Virginia and that if the court was going to overrule a long line
of cases directly in point it should do so by direction and not by
indirection.'
Should a situation similar to that in the principal case arise
today, the outcome would be governed by the Uniform Commercial
Code. Section 2-314 of the code provides that unless excluded or
modified, a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied
in a contract for their sale. In order to satisfy this implied warranty
of merchantability, the goods must be "fit for the ordinary purposes
for which such goods are used."'" Thus, it would appear that the
vendor in the principal case breached that warranty by sale of a
cooking stove which was unfit for cooking, or for that matter, any
other purpose. It would be no answer that the defect was latent
Id. at 216.
9 Id. at 217.
'0 UNIFOIM CoMxicmAL
8

CODE §

2-314 (2) (c).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol70/iss3/25

4

Denny: Sales--Implied Warranty of Merchantability

19681

CASE COMMENTS

and could not have been discovered by the vendor upon inspection.
For what the code requires is not evidence that the defects should or
could have been uncovered by the seller, but only that the goods
upon delivery were not of a merchantable quality or fit for their
particular purpose."
Even if one inclines toward the position taken by the minority
in the principal case and considers that the majority opinion does
violence to well-established principles of law in West Virginia, it
should be remembered that the case has little value as a precedent
setting decision since it deals with West Virginia law as it existed
prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. Therefore,
the principles of the case would apply only to contracts of sale
arising before July 1, 1964. The unimportance of the case in setting
precedent may in part account for the court's willingness to strain
reason and principles of law in order to arrive at what they felt to be
an equitable result.
Peter Thomas Denny

Torts-Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice
Foreign Object Left in the Patient
Action was brought by a patient against her physician to recover
damages for injuries sustained through alleged negligence of physician
in failing to remove laparotomy pad (lap pad) inserted in the
patient's abdomen during the course of surgery. The trial court held
that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was not applicable and required her
to produce expert evidence to establish D's negligence and P appealed
to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. Held, reversed and
remanded. Expert evidence is not required to establish the
physician's negligence where the patient showed (1) that while she
was in an unconscious state the physician was in complete control
of the operation and (2) the failure of physician to remove the
lap pad from her abdominal cavity before closing the wound
constitutes such a breach of duty owed to her that (3) a layman
could infer negligence without the aid of expert testimony. Under
these facts the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable. Easterling
v. Walton, 156 S.E.2d 787 (Va. 1967).
11 Vlases

v. Montgomery Ward &Co., 377 F. 2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967).
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